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VIII. CONCLUSION
The use of unadjudicated acts for proof of future dangerousness in
capital sentencing violates the defendant's rights under the Sixth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The presentation of such evidence with no
articulated standard of proof or cautionary instructions by the judge to
guide the jury in its penalty determination fails to meet the reliability
standards required in capital sentencing procedures. Admission of the
alleged conduct deprives the defendant of the notice, process, and
effective assistance of counsel to which he is entitled during the penalty
phase. Ultimately, if relevant at all to the issue of future dangerousness,
the acts as presented collectively are more prejudicial than probative of
defendant's potential future threat to society. Defense counsel must meet
the Commonwealth's attack by challenging each unadjudicated act and
defeating the overall effect such information could have on a sentencing
jury.
THE "TWO-EDGED" SWORD:
MITIGATION EVIDENCE USED IN AGGRAVATION
BY: CHARLES F. CASTNER
I. INTRODUCTION
In many capital cases, there really is little question of whether the
defendant actually committed the murder. The main issue in the trial
occurs during the penalty phase, when the jury is asked to answer the
question of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life in
prison. Therefore, the mitigation evidence offered in the penalty phase
of a capital murder trial can be the most important part of the trial for the
defendant. The defense lawyer must make sure that he or she has
prepared a strong theme for mitigation and that the mitigation evidence
is used only to support an argument for mitigation.
One problem which defense lawyers must be prepared to deal with
is mitigation evidence that could be used by the prosecution or viewed by
the jury to support the aggravating factor of future dangerousness.1
When the defense relies on the diminished capacity of the defendant or
his inability to "conform his conduct to the requirements of law, ' 2 the
same evidence could be used by the prosecution to argue that the
defendant poses a future danger to society because the defendant will
always suffer from the mental deficiency. The defense lawyer must be
prepared to prevent the prosecutor from posing this argument and to
proactively focus the jury's attention on the mitigating aspects of this
evidence.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
In Zant v. Stephens,3 the United States Supreme Court stated that if
the state had attached an aggravating label to "conduct that actually
should militate in favor of alesserpenalty, such as perhaps the defendant's
mental illness," then "due process of law would require that the jury's
decision to impose death be set aside." Stephens' prohibition of the use
of mitigating evidence in such a fashion is best understood in light of the
Supreme Court's holdings concerning the defendant's right to introduce
mitigating evidence.
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Lockett v. Ohio,
4
"that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer
... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Based on this reasoning, the Court found an Ohio death penalty
statute which restricted the range of mitigating circumstances that could
be considered by the sentencer to be unconstitutional.
5
1 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2; § 19.2-264.4(c) (1990).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4 (B) (iv) (1990). The Virginia
sentencing proceeding statute identifies this evidence as mitigating.
3 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
4 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978) (emphasis in original).
5 Id. at 608.
The constitutional right of a defendant to present any relevant
mitigating factor and to have it be considered was reaffirmed in Eddings
v. Oklahoma.6 In applying the holding of Lockett, Justice Powell stated
that "just as the state may not by statute preclude the sentencer from
considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. ' 7 Read
together, Lockett and Eddings stand for the proposition that the defendant
must be allowed to present any relevant mitigating circumstances and
that the sentencer, whether it be judge or jury, must consider the
mitigating nature of the evidence. The weight to be given the evidence
is still left to the sentencer's discretion, but the sentencer may not refuse
to consider the evidence.
The right of the defendant to present any relevant mitigating evi-
dence, and the responsibility of the sentencer to consider the mitigating
evidence, would not mean anything unless the sentencer could give
effect to that evidence. Thus, in Penry v. Lynaugh,8 the Supreme Court
held that the sentencer must be able to give effect to the mitigating
evidence in determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment. The Court recognized that the sentencer must
have the ability to give effect to the mitigating circumstance if they were
to uphold the underlying principle of Lockett and Eddings: that punish-
ment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
defendant.9 Justice O'Connor stated:
If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the
appropriateness of the death penalty, "evidence about the
defendant's background and character is relevant because of
the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse."10
In order to protect a defendant's constitutional right to present
evidence in mitigation of the defendant's mental or emotional problem,
and to have that evidence considered and given effect by the sentencer,
the prosecution must not be allowed to penalize the defendant's exercis-
ing of a constitutional right by using this same evidence for the purpose
of proving an aggravating factor. In addition, the jury must be cautioned
that they may not consider the evidence offered in mitigation as proof of
an aggravating factor. The danger of this happening was noted by Justice
O'Connor in Penry, stating that "Penry's mental retardation and history
6 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
7 Id. at 113-14 (emphasis in original).
8 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
9 Id. at 319.
10 Id. at319 (quotingCaliforniav.Brown,479 U.S. 538,545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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of abuse is thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthi-
ness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will
be dangerous in the future."t11
In Eddings, the Court held that when considering relevant mitigating
evidence, the sentencer "may not give it no weight by excluding such
evidence from their consideration." 12 To allow the sentencerto consider
mitigating evidence as proof of an aggravating factor would be much
worse than having the sentencer not consider the evidence at all.
Allowing the Commonwealth to use mitigating evidence to prove an
aggravating factor, or allowing the jury to consider the mitigating
evidence as aggravating, would violate the holdings ofLockett, Eddings,
Pemy and Stephens.
III. THE STATUTORY BASIS
The Virginia Legislature also has codified the principle that mitigat-
ing evidence of a defendant's mental condition cannot be used for the
purpose of proving an aggravating factor. Evidence derived from any
statement or disclosure made by the defendant "during a competency
evaluation performed pursuant to § 19.2-169.1, and evaluation per-
formed pursuant to § 19.2-169.5 to determine sanity at the time of the
offense, treatment provided pursuant to § 19.2-169.2 or § 19.2-169.6 or
a capital sentencing evaluation performed pursuant to this section"
cannot be used "at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for the
purpose of proving the aggravating circumstances specified in § 19.2-
264.4."13 The statute makes clear that although the Commonwealth can
use the evidence garnered from these evaluations to rebut the mitigation
issues raised by the defense, that is, to argue that the defendant does not
suffer from any mental problems or that the problem is not severe enough
to affect the defendant's capacity to conform his conduct, the govern-
ment cannot use the evidence to affinmatively prove an aggravating
circumstance. The statute does not fully cover the range of constitutional
protection discussed in the previous section, but it is evidence of the
legislature's recognition of the principle.
IV. KEEPING MITIGATING EVIDENCE MITIGATING
There are basically two ways to keep the defendant's mitigating
evidence from being used as proof of an aggravating factor. The first
method would deal with preventing the Commonwealth from using the
mitigation evidence for the purpose of proving an aggravating factor. If
it looks as though the Commonwealth may try to prove future dangerous-
ness using evidence offered in mitigation, the defense lawyer should file
a motion in limine to prevent the prosecution from doing So. 14 The
problem with this is that it may unnecessarily inform the Commonwealth
of any arguments that they were not planning on using to begin with. The
defense attorney should have an objection and supporting memorandum
in hand ready to go if the Commonwealth does attempt to raise the issue.
Even if the Commonwealth does not directly try to use the mitigating
evidence to support an argument of future dangerousness, the effect of
11 Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
12 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115.
13 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(G) (1990) (emphasis added).
14 Cf. Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306,1320 (1992). The court held
that comments made by the prosecutor to the jury, "You have to be able
to cope to function in this world. If you can't cope, you can't function,"
during closing arguments of the sentencing phase of the trial did not rise
to the level of constitutional error because "the prosecutor pressed on the
jury no specific conclusion concerning Adam's mental state, nor did he
explicitly urge the jury to treat Adam's mentality as an aggravating
circumstance." The court's treatment of the claim appeared to recognize
that the mitigating evidence could not be used by the prosecution as
support for an aggravating factor. See case summary of Adams, Capital
the evidence on the jury must be considered. The jury could naturally
infer that if the defendant has a mental problem which makes him unable
to conform his conduct to the law, he will be a future danger to society.
The defense lawyer can proactively try to keep this from occurring by
offering ajury instruction which attempts to focus the jury's attention on
the evidence as mitigating. The following jury instruction is offered as
an example of how such a proactive instruction might look if the "two-
edged sword" evidence were organic brain damage that affected the
defendant's ability to control himself:
15
THE PENRY JURY INSTRUCTION ON MITIGATION
The Court instructs the Jury that if you do find that an
alleged aggravating circumstance has been proved, that does
not automatically or necessarily mean that you should sen-
tence the defendant to death. Before deciding whether a
sentence of life in prison or death is appropriate, you are
required to consider any evidence that has been presented in
mitigation.
Mitigating circumstances may include, but are not lim-
ited to, any facts relating to the defendant's age, character,
education, environment, mental condition, life history and
background which might be considered extenuating or tend to
reduce his or her moral culpability, or make him or her less
deserving of the extreme punishment of death.
Among the mitigating evidence you have heard is
testimony on how the organic brain damage suffered by the
defendant significantly impaired his or her ability to con-
trol his or her behavior. This evidence of brain damage is
a mitigating circumstance affecting the defendant's culpa-
bility that you must consider as supporting a sentence less
than death. You may use this evidence only as a mitigating
circumstance, and should not use it in any manner as proof
of an aggravating circumstance.
You must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find
that there is evidence to support it. You are not required to be
convincedbeyond areasonable doubt thatamitigating circum-
stance exists before you must take that circumstance into
account as you deliberate this case.
The weight which you give to a particular mitigating
circumstance is a matter for your judgment. However, you
may not refuse to consider any evidence of mitigation and
thereby give it no weight.
This instruction reflects the principle which the Court has estab-
lished through its holdings inLockett, Eddings, Penry and Stephens. The
court should be urged to grant the giving of this instruction as an accurate
statement of the law pursuant to section 19.2-263.2,16 even though it
does not conform with the model jury instructions.
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 25 (1992).
15 The proposed language is only part of what should be offered as
instructions that fully explain the role of mitigating and aggravating
evidence under the statute. The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse has
developed fuller "mitigation" jury instructions to supplement the tradi-
tional model jury instructions which are made available to attorneys
representing capital defendants.
16 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-263.2. Jury instructions. - A proposed
jury instruction submitted by a party, which constitutes an accurate
statement of the law applicable to the case, shall not be witheld from the
jury solely for its nonconformance with model jury instructions (1992,
c. 522).
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V. CONCLUSION
Because of the importance of mitigation evidence, the defense
lawyer must ensure that the evidence offered in mitigation is not used or
perceived as proof of the aggravating factor of future dangerousness.
Instructing the jury that mitigation evidence proffered by the defendant
is to be considered as such, and cannot be considered as proof of an
aggravating circumstance, is essential to avoiding the "two-edged sword"
dilemma referred to by Justice O'Connor in Peniy v. Lynaugh. The right
to present relevant mitigating evidence, have that evidence considered
and given effect, and to not have that evidence used to prove or to be
viewed as an aggravating circumstance is guaranteed by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. It is the
defense lawyer's duty and responsibility to assure that the defendant's
right is recognized.
APPLYING THE VIRGINIA CAPITAL STATUTE TO JUVENILES
BY: KEVIN ANDREW CLUNIS AND NICHOLAS VANBUSKIRK
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia practitioners increasingly are facing cases where the
Commonwealth is seeking the death penalty against juvenile defendants.
These defendants sometimes are as young as fifteen years of age. The
most desirable outcome, of course, is to prevent the juvenile defendant
from ever having to face the possibility of the death penalty. This article
explores three ways in which the Virginia death penalty statute may be
challenged when it is applied against juvenile offenders. The first
challenge explains how the United States Supreme Court's decisions
preclude the application of the death penalty against fifteen year-old
offenders when, as under the Virginia scheme, the capital punishment
statute does not specify a minimum age. The second challenge, based on
the United States Supreme Court holdings in Stanford v. Kentucky l and
Wilkins v. Missouri2 , focuses on the inadequacy of Virginia's transfer
statutes where a defendant who is seventeen years or younger is being
certified to face a possible death sentence. The final challenge examines
why Virginia's statute allowing ajuvenile who is facing the death penalty
to waive her transfer hearing also runs afoul of Stanford and Wilkins.
II. THE STATUTE AS APPLIED TO MINORS
UNDER AGE SIXTEEN.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "Cruel and
Unusual Punishment." In implementing the mandate of this clause, the
Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that differences exist which
must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children
as compared with those of adults. 3 Similarly, the legislatures in all fifty
states have specifically applied this mandate to distinguish the criminal
treatment of individuals under age sixteen.4 However, several states,
including Virginia, have provided for special certification procedures
that are used to authorize minors below the age of sixteen to stand trial
as adults. 5 When such procedures are used to certify minors charged with
capital murder and allow them to face the death penalty because the
capital statute does not require a minimum age for the imposition of the
1 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
2 Id. at 361.
3 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 822,823 (1988). See also Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,590-91 (1975). See case summary of Thompson,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 21 (1988).
4 Every State has adopted "a rebuttable presumption" that a person
under 16 "is not mature and responsible enough to be punished as an
adult," no matterhow minor the offense may be. See Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 825, n. 22 (1988).
5 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269(A)(1982).
6 See Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31 (1988), 19.2-264.2 to 19.264.5
(1990).
7 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
8 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,293 (1976);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-597 (1977); Edmund v. Florida,
death penalty,6 the Eighth Amendment casts grave doubt on the statute's
constitutionality.
TheSupreme Courthas held thatin applyingtheEighthAmendment's
"Cruel and Unusual Punishment" prohibition,judges must be guided by
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.' 7 In performing that task, the Court looks to the work product
of state legislatures and sentencing juries and to the policies behind
society's acceptance of specific penalties in certain cases.
8
The Court applied this analysis in Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 when
it addressed the question of whether fifteen year-old offenders could be
subject to the death penalty. Like Virginia, the Oklahoma statutes
provided special procedures by which a "child" 10 could be tried as an
adult,11 and, as with the Virginia code, 12 the Oklahoma capital murder
statute did not state a minimum age. Citing Coker v. Georgia,13 a
plurality held that the imposition of the death penalty on an offender
under sixteen years of age always would be unconstitutional. 14
In arriving at its holding, the plurality reviewed "relevant legislative
enactments" and referred to a survey of "jury determinations" to support
its "judgement that such a young person is not capable of acting with the
degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty." 15 Citing
Bellotti v.Bairdt 6 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,17 the plurality endorsed the
proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. 18 The
Thompson plurality also identified data which it saw as establishing a
national consensus against subjecting a fifteen year-old to the death
penalty. At the time Thompson was decided, thirty-seven states had a
death penalty. Of these thirty-seven, eighteen states had a set minimum
age of sixteen or greater, 19 and no state had specifically set the age
minimum at less than age sixteen. 20 In addition, there were thirteen
states and the District of Columbia that did not allow the imposition of
the death penalty at all. Thus, the plurality found a strong national
consensus against the imposition of the death penalty against fifteen
year-old defendants.
In support of this national consensus theory, the Thompson Court
also relied on statistics showing the rarity of fifteen year-olds being
458 U.S. 782, 789-96 (1982).
9 487 U.S. at 820-21.
10 Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § I101(1)(Supp. 1987).
11 See Okla. Stat., tit. 10, § 11 12(b)(1981); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-
269 (1982).
12 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1988).
13 433 U.S. at 592.
14 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (opinion of Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun J.J.)
15 Id. at 822-23.
16 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
17 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
18 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (opinion of Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun, J.J.)
19 See id. at 829-30, n.30.
20 See id.
